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CAUSES  OF  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  PRIVATE  ECU  AND 
THE  BEHAVIOUR  OF  ITS  INTEREST  RATES: 
October  1982  - September  1985 
The  private  ECU  deposit  and  bond  markets  have  experienced  a 
spectacular growth which  nobody expected at the time of the creation of the 
ECU  and  of  the  EMS  in  March  1979.  At  the  end  of  June  1986  the  ECU  bank 
deposit market  had  reached  a  volume  of  about  66  billion ECU  (including the 
interbank market),  while  the international  ECU  bond  issues  had  reached  8.9 
billions  in  1986.  International  ECU  bond  issues  fl!ll,  however,  as  a 
percent  of  the  total market  from  5.3  per  cent  in  1985  to  3.9  per  cent  in 
1986.1)  The  reduction  in  the  market  share  of  ECU  bond  issue  in  1986  was 
due  to  the  competit:lon  from  the  strong  Deutsche  Mark,  the  weakness  of 
sterling which made  the  ECU  less attractive  for  investors  and  to the  large 
volume of issues of end  1985,  which  the market  needed to digest. 
This  paper  is  d.tvided  into  three  parts.  section  I  deals  briefly 
with  the  causes  of  the  development  of  the  private  ECU,  both  in  the  bank 
deposit and  bond  markets.  Particular attention is devoted to the role that 
capital controls  in Italy and  France  have  played  in the  development of the 
market.  Section II analyses  the  causes  of  the  fluctuations  of  the  spread 
between the quoted  ECU  interest rate and  the combined  Eurocurrency interest 
rate  (or theoretical rate).  In Section III  a  number  of very  simple  tests 
are presented  comparing  the  behaviour of  interest rates in the  ECU  deposit 
market  with  those  in  the  Eurodollar,  Euromark  and  Europound  deposit 
market.  The first test is a  test of Meiselman's  (1966)  expectations theory 
about the term structure of interl!st rates.  This test is admittl!dly rather 
crude  and  is  valid  only  under  very  restrictive  assumptions.  Then  a  test 
suggested  by  Fama  ( 1984)  of  the  hypothesis  that  the  observed  forward 
interest rate contains information about the future spot rate,  which  allows 
a  variable risk premium,  is presented.  Finally a  simple market  efficiency 
test  is  performed  for  all  four  Euro-currencies  by  regressing  the  future 
spot rate on  the past forward  rate,  following  Frenkel  (1976). 
(*)  we  would  like to  thank  our  colleagues  Paul  De  Grauwe,  Erik  De  Souza~ 
Hermann-Josef  Dudler,  Helmut  Lohan  and  Manfred  Neumann  for  useful  comments 
and Vittorio Basano for  helpful programming assistance. 
(1)  The  loss in market  share was  l!ven  more  pronounced  for  syndicated bank 
credits:. from  6.2 per  cen~ in 1985  to 1.7 in 1986. -2-
The  data  used  for  this  analysis  are  monthly  averac:;tes  of  daily 
figures  obtained  from  Chase  Econometrics  which  in.  turn  collects  them  from 
the Financial  Times.  The  data  is available  only  starting at  the  beginning 
of  October  1982.  The  last observation  relates  to  end  September  1985.  All 
data are averages of bid  and offer rates. 
The set contains interest rates on deposits of  1,  3,  6  and  12  months 
maturity.  With these maturities  we  are able  to extract  from  the data only 
forward  interest  rates  on  deposit  of  3  and  6  months  maturi  tes.  All  the 
tests  mentioned  above  are  performed  with  non  overlapping  quarterly  data, 
obtained  by  taking  every  third  observation  of  the  monthly  data  set.  The 
use of overlapping monthly data would  have  generated strong autocorrelation 
of  the  residuals.  Because  the  sample  period  is  relatively  short  the 
degrees of freedom are only nine.2) 
1.  The  causes of the  d~velopment of the private Ecu  market 
Among  the  causes  of  the  pr.i.vate  ECU's  success  probably  the  most 
important  is the  low  risk-high  return  characterist.i.cs  of  the  private  ECU. 
Being defined in terms  of  a  basket  of  currencies its value is likely to  be 
more  stable than the value of any  individual component  currency both for an 
investor whose  consumption  basket is in third currencies  (US  dollar,  yens) 
or  in  component  currencies.  For  the  same  reason  its  interest  rate  is 
likely  to  be  less  volatile  than  the  interest  rate  of  any  individual 
currency.3) 
The  low  risk  - h.i.gh  return  characteristics  of  the  private  Ecu  has 
been  a  cause  of  its  development,  thanks  to  the  existence  of  transaction 
costs.  With  zero transaction costs investors and  borrowers  could diversify 
their  risk  by  forming  their  own  preferred  basket  of  currencies  and  the 
private Ecu  would never have  developed.4) 
( 2)  If  we  had  interest  rates  on  deposits  of  two  months  maturity,  we 
could  calculate  forward  rates  for  the  one  month  maturity  and  we 
could  have  performed  the  tests  with  monthly  data,  without 
overlapping the period. 
( 3)  This  does  not  exclude  that  for  instance  for  a  Dutch  investor,  the 
Deutsche  Mark  may  be  more  stable  than  the  ECU  in  terms  of  Dutch 
Florins,  nor  that  the  German  interest rate  may  be  more  stable  than 
the  ECU  interest rate. 
(4)  This  important point was suggested by  Hermann-Josef  Dudler. -3-
Another  cause  is  the  favourable  attitude  of  the  Commission  of  the 
European  Communities  and  the  European  Investment  Bank  towards  the  private 
ECU  and  the  active  role  they  have  played  in  the  market  in  the  .i.nitial 
stages of its development. 
More  controversial are  the roles  that  the  European  Monetary  System 
(EMS)  and  the  Exchange  Rate  Mechanism  (  ERM)  on  the  one  hand  and  the 
existence of capital  controls  on  the other  have  played  in  the  development 
of  the  private  Ecu.  On  the  role  of  the  EMS  and  the  ERM  there  are  two 
opposite  views:  one  maintains  that  the  risk  diversification  function  of 
the Ecu  is reduced as  the system becomes  more  coordinated  and  the  ERM  moves 
towards  a  system of  fixed exchange rates.  As  Vaubel put it:  "any narrowing 
of  the margins  of  fluctuations  reduces  the Ecu's  competitive  edge  in terms 
of .short  run  exchange  rate  stability"  (Vaubel,  1987).  The  second  view 
holds  that  the  declared  object.i.ve  of  EMS  member  currencies  to  coordinate 
their monetary  policy  reinforces  the  private  Ecu.  According  to  this  view 
the  success  of  the  private  ECU  is  also  related  to  the  existence  the  ERM 
linking most  E~ component  currencies which  keeps  the short run volatility 
of  exchange  rates  of  component  currencies  against  each  other  at  low 
levels.  This  is  especially  important  for  ECU  investors  and  borrowers 
residing in  EMS  member  countries.  They  constitute  the  bulk of  ECU  ·primary 
lenders and borrowers. 
In  the  ERM  the  Ecu  also plays  the  role  of  the  pivot of  the  system 
and  this increases  the confidence in the  private  Ecu.  The  success  of  the 
private  Ecu  during  the  period  of  stability  of  exchange  rates  from  April 
1983  to  end  1985  seems  to  support  this  second  view.  Viceversa  the 
inclusion of the Drachma,  a  high inflation currency,  into the definition of 
the  Ecu  in  September  1984  has  been  perceived  by  market  participants  as  a 
negative  factor,  although  its  weight  is  only  about  1  per  cent.  If  a 
currency with a  large weight in the basket became  unstable this may  reduce 
the  attractiveness  of  the  Ecu  as  a  portfolio  investment,  despit~.t  a  low 
covariance  of  its exchange  rate  and  interest  rate  with  those  of  the  more 
stable component currencies.  The  experience of  1986  is instructive in this 
respect.  The  private  Ecu  also  lost market  shares  because of the  weakness -4-
and volatility of sterling,  which  is part of  the definition of the  Ecu  but 
does  not  participate  in  the  ~RM.  This  occurred  despite  the  fact  that 
sterling interest rates  were  very  high  both  in  nominal  and  in  real  terms. 
It is safe to  conclude  therefore that  the  fact  that the ECU  was  a  pivot of 
the  ERM  and  that  countries  participating  in  .tt  closely  coordinate  their 
monetary  pol.i.cies  has  contributed  to  the  development  of  the  private  Ecu 
despite  its  reduced  attractiveness  as  an  instrument  of  diversification. 
This  does  not  exclude,  however,  that in the  future  the balance between the 
confidence  creating  role  of  the  EMS  and  the  ERM  and  the  diversification 
function  of  the  Ecu  which  is  reduced  by  them,  may  change  and  that further 
convergence may  make  the Ecu  less attractive. 
There are  two  reasons,  however,  to believe that the private Ecu  will 
retain its attractiveness.  First if the private Ecu  succeeds  in developing 
as  a  m~dium of exchange, it could  become  the European  "vehicle currency"  to 
use  a  term  coined  by  Alexander  Swoboda,  substituting  the  us  dollar  this 
side  of  the  Atlantic.  Corporations  engaged  in  international trade  would 
reduce  their  transaction  and  interest  costs  by  holding  one  currency  which 
is  accepted  in  every  EMS  member  country  rather  than  by  holding  several 
European  currencies.S)  In  turn  this  will  foster  its  role  as  a  financ.i.al 
asset.  The  role  of  the  private  Ecu  as  a  medium  of  exchange  is  today 
virtually inexistent.  The  increased  use  of  the private  Ecu  as  a  financial 
asset,  a  medium of exchange  and  a  currency of invoicing of  European  imports 
would  also shield Europe  from  the instability of the US  dollar.  Second,  as 
the  ERM  moves  closer  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  the  variability  of 
short  term  interest  rates  in  member  currencies  will  have  to  incr~taae, 
especially  if  cap!  tal  controls  are  relaxed  further.  Already  dur.tng  the 
period  1983-86,  when  the  stability of  exchange  rates within  the  system was 
high,  one  has  observed  that national interest rates  have  moved  in opposit• 
directions.  The  smooth  working  of  the  balance  of  payments  adjustment 
mechanism  ~nder pegged  exchange  rates  requires  this  subordination of  short 
term interest rates to the external objecttve  (Russo  and Tullio,  1987).  It 
follows  that  the  interest  rate  on  the  ECU,  being  an  average  of  int11reat 
rates  of  component  currencies,  will  possess  a  greater  stability  than 
interest  rates  on  any  indiv.i.dual  currency  and  will  probably  be 
characterised by_  a  lower risk premium as well. 
(5)  Swoboda  (1973). -5-
It follows  from  the  above  discussion  that  the  relationship  between 
the  development  of  the  ERM  and  the  development  of  the private  Ecu  may  not 
be  monotonic.  The  attractiveness  of  the  private  Ecu  is  likely  to  be  very 
small  in  an  incohesive  system  with  member  currencies  fluctuating  wildly. 
It may  increase as the  cohesion of the system increases;  as monetary policy 
coordination  becomes  stronger the  currency diversification function  of  the 
Ecu  may,  however,  be  reduced  and  discourage its development.  As  one  moves 
closer  to  a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  and  the  variability  of  national 
short  term  rates  increases,  the  pr.i.vate  Ecu  may  become  more  attract.i.ve 
aga.i.n,  especially  at the short end  of the market. 
On  the  relat.i.onship  between  capital  controls  and  their  role  in  the 
development of the private Ecu  there are also two  opposing views.  One  view 
favoured  particularly  in  German  official  circles  holds  that  capital 
controls  have  been  beneficial  for  the  development  of  the  private  Ecu 
market.  The  European  Conmission  holds  instead  the  oppos.i.te  view.  Those 
who  believe that capital  controls  have  been  benef.i.cial  for  the private Ecu 
argue  that  Italian  and  French  firms  borrow  heavily  in  Ecu  and  are 
stimulated  to  do  so  by  exchange  restr.tctions  in  their  respective 
countries.  But  French  and  Ital.tan  firms  are  generally  free  to  borrow  in 
any currency  (including their own)  and  would  not choose  Ecus if they didn't 
have  an intrinsic appeal. 
The  existence of capital controls has probably contributed to making 
new  established parities more  credible after  a  realignment  and  to  increase 
the  expected  durat.i.on  of  new  par.i.ties.  S.i.nce  nominal  interest  rat-:Js  .tn 
France  and  Italy were  so far  h.i.gher  than  .tn  strong currency members,  French 
and  Ital.tan  firms  had  an  incentive  to  borrow  abroad  after  real.i.gnments  to 
take  advantage  of  lower  interest  rates  without  incurring  a  large  exchange 
rate risk.  Again  if they borrowed  in Ecu  rather  than in Deutsche  Marks it 
was  because  the  former  had  an  intrinsic  appeal.  On  the  contrary  thl! 
outright  prohibition  by  the  German  government  for  German  firms,  banks  and 
households  to hold  Ecu  in Germany  and  to borrow in Ecu  has certainly been  a 
negative factor  for the development of  the market.6) 
(6)  The  ban was  1.1.fted  in June  1987. 6-
Tha  Italian  govarnmant  has  issued  dabt  exprassad  in  Ecu  which 
Italian  residents  were  allowed  to  subscribe.  As  only  the  Italian 
government  and  the European  Investment Bank were  allowed to tap tha Italian 
domestic market  for borrowing in Ecu,  they mada  use of their monopoly  power 
and  borrowad at a  reduced cost:  the yield in Italy was  generally  lower  than 
the  yield  prevail.i.ng  abroad,  as  arbitrage  was  prevented  from  operating. 
Exchange  controls  coupled  w.i.th  the  granting  of  a  monopoly  power  to  two 
issuers  can  hardly  be  considered  a  measure  fostering  the  private  Ecu. 
However,  Italy  and  Frar  ... ce  have  had  at  times  credit  controls  on  lending 
expressed  in  domestic  currency  and,  when  they  were  binding  they  have 
undoubtedly  st.i.mulated  borrowing  in  fore.i.gn  currencies  by  domestic  firms 
and  therefore indirectly,  borrowing in Ecu.  Credit controls accompanied  by 
exchange  restrictions  may  have  therefore at timas  influenced  the  amount  of 
borrowing and  lending in Ecu. 
Exchange  controls  have  had  a  serious  impact  on  the  gaographical 
distribution  of  borrowing  and  lending  in  Ecu.  Borrowers  typically  are 
residents of  high interest rate countries with capital controls,  where they 
are  free  to  borrow  in any  currency  but not  to  invest in foreign currencies 
or  Ecus,  and  lenders  ara  mainly  res.i.dents  of  the  Benelux  countries  where 
the  domestic  interest rate  was  generally  lower  than  the  one  on  the Ecu  and 
there  are  no  prohibitions  to  hold  foreign  assets  nor  Ecus.  Capital 
controls . in  high  interest  rate  countries  have,  however,  probably  implied 
higher  transaction  costs  for  Benelux  residents  interested  in  diversifying 
risk  by  forming  their  own  basket.  Thus  indirectly  capital  controls  may 
hava  mada  tha  pr.i.vate  Ecu  mora  attract.i.ve  than  .i.t  would  otherw.i.se  have 
been.  This latter point is likely to be not very important,  however. 
Exchange  controls  have  therefore  had  mainly  negative effects  on  the 
development  of  the private  Ecu  both  by  limiting the  access  to it to German 
borrowers  and  to Italian and  French investors  and  by  unbalancing the market 
geographically.  This  latter  view  finds  some  support  in the  fact that the 
Ecu  market  developed  considerably at a  time when  capital controls have been 
relaxed  (since  1983)  and  their effectiveness  reduced  by  the willingness of 
countries  participating  .i.n  the  ERM  to  al.i.gn  their  real  interest  rates  to 
German  ones. -7-
Th~  d!ff~r~nc~  b~tw~~n  any  Eurocurrency  interest  rate  and  the 
domestic  interest  rate  on  assets  of  equal  risk  and  maturity  has 
traditionally  b~en  consider~d a  proxy  of  the  overall  d~gree of  restriction 
on  capital  flows  applied  by  the  monetary  author  i t.tes  of  the  country  in 
question.  In  the  absence  of  capital  controls  and  transaction  costs  and 
assuming  equal  reserve  requir~ments  at  home  and  in  Euromarkets,  the  two 
rates  would  tend  to  coincide  owing  to  the  op~ration  of  arbitrageurs. 
Because of  the  r~strictions on  capital  flows  applied  by  the  French  and  the 
Italian monetary authorities,  the Eurofranc and the Eurolira interest rates 
have  usually  been  significantly  higher  than  their  domestic  counterpart. 
Table  1  contains  the  monthly  interest spreads  between  the  Euromarkets  and 
domet.tc markets  for  3  months  deposits  for  the  ECU,  the  DM,  the French  Franc 
and  the Lira.  The  averages  for  ~ach y~ar ar~ reported at the bottom of the 
tabl~.7)  In  1983  the average  spread was  3.68  for  the  French  Franc and  2.05 
for  the  L.i.ra.  However,  th~se  figures  are  heavily  influenced  by 
expectat.tons  of  the  March  1983  realignm~nt.  From  Apr.tl  to  December  1983 
the  average  was  1.54  for  the  French  Franc  and  1.14  for  the  Italian  L.tra. 
For  the  French  Franc  the  spread  fell to  0.81  in  1984  and  0.41  in the f.trst 
9  months  of  1985.  For  the  L.i.ra  the  average  was  1.54  in  1984  and  o. 76  in 
the first 9  months  of  1985. 
For  the  Deutsche  Mark  the  average  spread  has  been  negat.i.ve  but 
negligible  being  .tn  the  order  of  10  to  20  basis points,  with  the domestic 
rate  syst~matically exc~eding the Euromark  rate probably  ~cause of reserve 
requirements  on  bank  d~posits held  .i.n  Germany  by  non-residents.  Also  for 
the  DM  the  absolute  value  of  the  spread  has  tend~d to  fall  over  time,  but 
the changes are probably too  small  to attach great  significanc~ to them. 
The  spread  between  the  combined  Ecu  interest rate calculated  in the 
Euromarkets  and  the  combined  Ecu  rate calculated  in  national markets  gives 
a  synthetic view  of  changes  in  capital  market  restrictions  within  the  EMS 
(7)  These  spr~ads have to be interpreted with some  caution first because 
the  inter~st  rat~s  are  not  exactly  comparable  in  terms  of  risk 
characteristics  and  s~condly  becaus~ the  Euro-int~rest rates  are  averages 
of  daily  figures  while  most  national  interest  rates  are  averages  of 
Wednesday quotations. -8-
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\ 
SPREAD  BETWEEN  EURO  AND  DO~IESTIC 3 -tiONTH  INTEREST  RATES 
(MONTHLY  AVERAGES) 
I -- I======  I===  -I  1=======1 
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J9S~ OCTClBF.R  I  1.1R78  I  -0.42  I  5.3936  I  3.A3  I 
NOVE~!BER  I  1.4iOS  -O.li31  I  5.3889  I  6. 1266  I 
DECE~1BER  I  2.4:;76  -0.2323  I  9.762  I  6.965  I 
1983  JANUARY  ' 
2.1918  -0.2666  I  8.7687  I  5.4896  I 
FEBRUARY  I  2.206  -0.1294  I  9.1341  I  4.4427  I 
MARCH  I  2.8535  -0.3256  I  12.4149  I  4.3844  I 
APRIL  r  0. 1864  -0.1769  I  1.2035  I  -0.0~62  I 
!1AY  I  0.0724  -0.2213  I  1.3418  I  -0.4808 
JUNE  I  0.2708  -0.142  I  1.8204  1.0048 
JULY  I  0.1111  -0.3483  I  1.4644  0.7176 
AUGUST  I  0.4862  -0.1663  2.723  1.563 
SEPTE~1BER  0.5015  -0.1216  2.0012  1.7461 
OCTOBER  0.3538  -0.2863  1.6355  2.8422 
NOVE~IBER  0.178  -o. 1526  0.6436  ] . 4525 
DECEMBER  0.2789  -o. 1482  1.0041  1.4425 
1984  JANUARY  0.244  -0.0875  0.8265  1.4675 
FEBRUARY  O.i181  -0.0814  3. 1065  2.34 
MARCH  0.657  -0.1525  2.7181  3.2344 
APRil..  0.1178  -0.1293  0.6967  1.4~69 
HAY  0.]  ~ 74  -0.0935  0.4249  1. 2 715 
JUNE  0.0846  -0.2362  0.5375  1.1219 
JULY  0.144  -0.2578  0.2~12  2.0687 
AUGVST  -0.0241  -0.3653  0.0806  0.69 
SEPTE~JBER  0.1758  -0.2141  0.2094  1.1966 
OCTOBER  0.2178  -o. 1435  0.4181  1. 81 
NOVE!1BER  0.1203  -0.1556  0.5125  1.1312 
DECE~fBSR  O.C:!53  -0. 133  -0.0359  O.i287 
' 
1985  JA~:t:ARY  0.~381  -o  .. 0341  0.0606  1. 45 
FJ-J:: ;.-:_·ARY  0.4177  0.0714  0.3415  1.8312 
:1AJ\CH  0.4.:.87  -0.1722  0. 1656  2 . .2469 
APRIL  0.1716  -0.1189  0.1195  l.G737 
HAY  -0. Hl72  -0.1386  -0.0231  -0.555 
JUNE  0.0421  -0.1237  0.1062  0.3031 
JULY  0.0789  -0.2045  0.5102  -0.14 
I  AUGtJST  0.3489  -0.1551  1.673  0.3437 
I  SEPTENBERI  0. ] 651  I  -0.085  0. 7458  -0.1167 
1---------------1-----------J------~---- ----------- -----------
I  1983  ~JEAN  I  0.8083  I  -0.2071  3.6796  :!.0462 
I  19A4  MEAN  I  0.2::!40  I  -0.1708  0.8105  1. 5423 
I  1985  MEAN  I  0.~004  I  -o. 1068  0.4111  0.7597 
I~= ---
* DIFF·ERF.t\CES  BETWEEN  CD~IBINED EUROCURRENCY  AND  CO~IBJNED  DO~IESTIC 
THREE-NONTH  l~'TEREST RATES -9-
and/or their effectiveness during the sample period.  It has  fallen from  81 
basis points in  1983  to 22  in  1984  and  to 20  in the first 9  months  of  1985. 
Chart  1  shows  the  spreads  reported  in  Table  1.  Even  disregarding 
the period before March  1983  which is disturbed  by  the general  realignment, 
a  downward  trend  in the  spread  for  the  ECU,  the  French  Franc  and  the  Lira 
is visible. 
2.  The  spread between the quoted  ECU  interest rate and  the combined 
Eurocurrency rate 
Chart  2  shows  the  diff~rence  hetw~~n the  quot~d  ECU  deposit  rate at 
the  three  months  maturity  and  the  combined  Eurocurrency  interest  rate .a) 
Table  2  contains  th~  same  difference  for  deposits  of  maturity  of  1,  3,  6 
and  12  months.  The  spread  reached  a  minimum  negative  value  of  50  basis 
points  at  the  time  of  the  March  1983  general  realignment  and  a  maximum 
positive value of  47  basis points in August  1984,  the last full month prior 
to the mid-September  change in the weights.  The  data reported in the table 
seem  to  suggest  that  the  spread  was  more  sensitive  to  expectat.tons  of 
realigilments  at  the  one  month  maturity  while  it  was  more  sensitive  to 
expectations  of  changes  in  the  weights  at  the  longer  end  of  the  market. 
Expectations of  realignments  and  of  changes  in the  weights must  be  clearly 
important factors to explain changes  in the spread. 
During  the  sample  period,  there was  only  one  general  realignment  in 
March  1983,9)  and  only  one  change  in  the  defin.ttion  of  the  basket,  in 
September  1984,  when  the quantity of  the member  currencies  was  changed  and 
the.Greek Drachma  was  introduced into the basket. 
(8)  The  method  used  to compute  the  combined  Eurocurrency  interest rate 
is Me·thod  A which is illustrated in Appendix  1. 
(9)  The  realignment  of  July  1985  was  m:lnor  since  it involved  only  a 
change in the central rate of the lira and  was  largely unexpected. (JJ 
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- TABLE  2  -
DIFFERENCE  BETWEEN  QUOTED  ECU  DEPOSIT  RATE  AND 
COMBINED  EUROCURRENCY  RATES  (*) 
(HONTHLY  AVERAGES) 
I  I  I  -I  -I  I 
I  I  MATURITY  I 
I  I 
I  I  1  MONTH  3  MONTHS  6  MONTHS  12  ~IONTHS  I 
I  I  I 
I  1982  OCTOBER  I  -o. 1704  -0.2299  -0.1918  -0.1943  I 
I  NOVENBER  I  -0. 1866  -0.2316  -0.2057  -o. 1968  I 
DECEMBER  I  -o. 1224  -o. 1826  -0.1612  -o. 1563  I 
AVERAGE  I  -0. 1598  -0.2147  -0.1862  -o. 1825  I 
1983  JANUARY  I  -0.1701  -o. 1094  -0.1155  -0.1501 
FEBRUARY  I  -0.~571  -o. 1678  -0.1574  -0.0928 
HARCH  I  -1 . .3971  -0.5048  -0.1998  -0.1515 
APRIL  I  -0.2326  -0.2892  -0.14i7  -o. 162 
MAY  I  -0.1909  -0. 1633  -0.1705  -0.1617 
Jl't\E  I  -0. 1203  -0.1362  -0.1477  -0.256 
JULY  I  -0.2501  -0.0723  -0.0644  •0.0556 
AUGUST  I  -0.0647  -0.1106  -0.0576  -0.0729 
SEPTE~fBER  I  -0.0492  -0.0406  -0.0194  -0.0591 
OCTOBER  I  -0.0232  4.114E-03  -0.0369  -0.0528 
NOVEMBER  I  0.0166  -0.0735  -0.0525  -0.0602 
DECEMBER  I  0. 1047  -0.0705  -0.0473  -0.0796 
,\VERAGE  I  -0.21951  -0.1445  -0.1014  -0.1128 
1984  JANUARY  1.07  0.1485  0.1396  0.1206 
FEBRUARY  0.2864  0.0474  0.0403  0.0544 
MARCH  0.3357  0.2262  0. 1692  0.2999 
APRIL  0.3786  0.32  0.3392  0.4604 
MAY  0.3818  0.2894  0.2343  0.2262 
:JUNE  0.-4223  0.3708  0.381  0.187 
JULY  0.1703  0.261  0.2805  0.1337 
AUGUST  0.4981  0.4697  0. 6.742  0.6504 
SEPTE~fBER  0.3649  0.354  0.5717  0.5533 
OCTOBER  0.2414  0.2295  0.2185  0.2952 
NOVEMBER  0.:!488  0.1824  0.2629  0.4015 
DECE~IBER  0. 1402  0.1726  0.1934  0.2621 
AVERAGE  0.3665  0.2560  0.2921  0.3037 
I  1985  JAi\UARY  I  0.2019  I  0.1505  I  0.1275  I  0.0831  I 
I  FEBRUARY  I  0.3397  I  0.0891  I  0.0117  I  -0.1926  I 
I  MARCH  I  0.~322  I  0.2251  I  0.1917  I  -0.0233  I 
I  APRIL  I  0.2193  I  0.2293  I  0.2448  I  0.2851  I 
I  MAY  I  0. 176  I  0.2404  I  0.3005  I  0.2901  I 
I  JUNE  I  0. 1 i35  I  0.2197  I  0.2165  I  0.1159  I 
I  JULY  I  0.1176  I  0. 1435  I  0.1063  I  -0.0279  I 
I  AUGUST  I  0.0799  I  0,0684  I  0.0838  I  0.0415  I 
I  SEPTEHBERJ  -0.0974  I  0. 1202  I  0.1347  I  0.054  I 
AVERAGE  0. 1603  0. 16 74  0.1575  0.0696 
I  =1==--=1  I 
STANDARD  DEV.  0.3710  0.2185  0.2178  0.2293 
~*)·.QUOTED ECU  RATE  HI NUS  COMBINED  RATE. (3) 
-13-
The  reasons  why  changes  in  expectations  of  realignments  and  of 
changes  in  the  Ecu  weights  should  lead  to  changes  in  the  spread  are  the 
following.  As  to  expectations  of  realignments  the  reason  why  they 
influence  the  spread  is  related  to  the  existence  of  transaction  costs  in 
arbitraging  between  the  ECU  market  and  Euromarkets  and  to  the  fact  that 
these  costs  change  as  expectations  of  realignments  change.  The  difference 
between bid  and  ask prices normally increases when  a  realignment approaches 
both  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  and  in  the  Eurodeposit  market. 
Arbitrage  operations  therefore  become  more  costly  and  this  should  explain 
why  the  spread  can  reach  the  levels  observed  during  and  before  March 
1983.  Cons.i.der  the  case  of  an  imminent  devaluation  of  the  French  Franc. 
The  Eurofranc  interest  rate  starts  reflecting  the  expectations  of  the 
devaluation and  goes  up  g.i.v.i.ng  r.i.se  to the possibility of making profits by 
borrowing  in  Ecu  and  invest:lng  :ln  Eurofrancs  and  :ln  the  other  component 
currenc.i.es  of  the  Ecu,  w.i.thout  incurring  an  exchange  risk.  However  the 
possibility  of  making  profits  is  l:lmtted  a)  by  the  widening  of  the  spread 
between  b.i.d  and  ask  rates  in  the  ECU-depos:lt  market  b)  the  w:ldening  of  the 
spread  between  hid  and  ask  rates  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  where  the 
borrowed  Ecu  has  to he  transformed  into its component  currenc.i.es  and  c)  by 
the  widening  of  the  spread  in  the  Euro  deposit  markets  of  the  component 
currencies. 
Expectations  of  changes  in  the weights  have  led  to  a  large increase 
in the spread  in the months  preceding the  September  1984  change because the 
weight of weak  (high interest)  currencies were  expected to be  increased and 
those  of  strong  (low  interest  currencies)  was  expected  to  be  reduced.  In 
addition  the  Greek  Drachma  was  expected  to be  introduced  in the definit.i.on 
of  the  basket.  Table  3  shows  the  we.i.ghts  of  the  member  currencies  before 
and  after the  change.  As  the  ECU  is defined  in terms  of  a  fixed  number of 
each  member  currency,  the  we.tght  of  currenc.tes  that  tend  to  depreciate 
falls  in  timf!.  Member  countries  can,  according  to  the  EMS  agreemf!nts, 
reassess  the  weights  every  5  years  or  every  time  that  the  weight  of  one 
currency  changes  by  more  than  25  per  cent.  The  quoted  Ecu  interest rate 
was  already  incorporating  the  expected  increase  in  the  combined  interest 
rate already prior to the  September  17  change  in the weights. J
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There  are other  factors  influencing  the  spread  as  well.  First,  in 
equilibrium and  in the presence  of  transaction  costs,  the  ECU  deposit rate 
would  not  necessarily be  equal  to  the  combined  rate7  it would  be  lower  if 
ECU  deposits  d.i. vers.i.fy  the  risk  and  h.i.gher  .i.f  the  interest  rates  are 
positively  correlated.  This  risk  factor  would  not  be  constant  through 
time7  as  interest  rates  and  inflation  rates  of  component  currencies  move 
closer  together  and  they  become  closer  substitutes,  the  risk 
diversification  element  would  become  smaller  as  d.i.scussed  in  the  previous 
section.  In  a  world  without  transaction  costs  private  agents  wanting  to 
diversify  the  risk  would  form  their  own  basket and  the  Ecu  would  lose its 
diversfication function.  If  the  Ecu  existed  in  such  a  world  the  comb.i.ned 
and  the  quoted  interest  rate  could  not  d.i.verge.  Secondly,  especially  :ln 
the early part of  the  sample  per.i.od  the  ECU  market  could  be  considered  as 
in  its  infancy.  Two  possible  scenarios  can  be  envisaged.  One  is  that 
banks  involved  in  ECU  lending  could  have  fixed  interest  rates  at  below 
competit.i.ve  levels  to  attract  customers  and  that  as  a  result  they  had  to 
offer correspondingly low  .i.nterest rates  on deposits.  A  second  scenario is 
that  the  banks,  being  new  in  the  business,  were  demand:lng  a  very  large 
spread  between  borrowing  and  lending  rates,  which  depressed  the  borrowing 
rates  substantially  below  the  combined  Eurocurrency  rate  and  possibly 
raised  lending rates  above  the  combined  Eurolending rates.  This  behaviour 
would  have  also  been  just.i.fied  by  the  init.i.ally  higher  transact.i.on  costs 
due  to  the  large  d:lsequilibrium  between  primary  ECU  liabilities and  assets 
of  Eurobanks  and  the  ensu.i.ng  costs  of  "bundling"  the  ECU.  As  the  market 
became  less  unbalanced,  as  a  result of economies  of scale setting in and  as 
banks  became  more  famil.i.ar  with  the  new  instrument,  the  spread  between 
deposit  and  lending  rates  may  have  fallen,  moving  the  quoted  ECU  deposit 
rate closer to the combined  Eurocurrency deposit rate.  Unfortunately there 
is no  direct way  to  test this  hypothesis,  since  homogenous  time  series  on 
the  spread  between  ECU  deposit  and  lending  rates  are  not  available. 
However  a  very  crude  attempt was  made  to test for  a  significant  effect of 
the  ratio  of  bank  ECU  deposits  to  hank  ECU  assets,  as  a  proxy  for  the 
disequilibrium in the market  and  the potential implications for  transaction 
costs  of  banks,  on  the  spread  between  the  quoted  and  the  combined  ECU 
.i.nterest  rate.  No  sign.i.ficant  influence  was  detected.  However  the  proxy 
used  for  disequilibr.i.um  in  the  market  is  available  for  only  part  of  tlu! - 16-
sample  period  and  only  on  a  quarterly  basis;  the  series  was  interpolated 
linearly to obtain monthly figures. 
For  completeness  it  should  be  observed  that  the  spread  was  again 
negative  at  the  time  of  writing  10)  and  that  in  1986  the  disequilibrium 
between  primary  bank  borrowing  and  lending  in  ECU  was  substantially 
reduced. 
3.  The  term  structure of  Ecu  deposit rates,  tests of market efficiency and 
comparisons with other Euro-currencies 
In  the  previous  section  the  factors  affecting  the  behaviour  of  the 
spread  between  the  quoted  and  the  combined  ECU  deposit  interest rate have 
been analysed.  In  this  section three  separate tests will  be presented  for 
the  ECU,  the  Eurodollar,  the  Euromark  and  the  Europound  interest  rates. 
The  tests  are  first  a  test  of  Meiselman'  s  expectat.i..ons  theory  about  the 
term  structure  of  .interest  rates,  a  test  of  the  hypothesis  that  the 
observed  forward  interest  rate  contains  information  about  the  future  spot 
rate  suggested  by  Fama  (1984)  and  finally  a  simple  market  efficiency test 
which  consists  of  regressing  the  future  spot  interest  rate  on  the  past 
forward  interest rate  (Frenkel  1976). 
The  sample  period  is October  1982  to  September  1985.  The  data  set 
used  are  monthly  averages  of  daily  figures  purchased  from  Chase 
Econometrics  which  in turn collects them  from the Financial Times.  All the 
data are averages of bid  and  ask  rates. 
The  data  set contains  interest rates  on  deposits  of  1,  3,  6  and  12 
months  maturity.  The  interest  rate  on  deposits  of  9  months  maturity  was 
obtained by  geometric  interpolation.  With  these maturities  we  are  able  to 
extract  from  the  data  only  forward  interest  rates  on  deposits  of  3  and  6 
months  maturities.  All  the  tests  mentioned  above  are  performed  with  non 
overlapp.i..ng  quarterly  data  obta.tned  by  tak:lng  every  third  observation  of 
the  monthly  data  set.  The  use  of  overlapping  monthly  data  would  have 
sharply  increased  the  numbers  of  degrees  of  freedom  but  would  have  led  to. 
10)  May  1987 -17-
strong  autocorrelation  of  the  residuals.  Because  the  sample  period  is 
relatively  short  the  degrees  of  freedom  are  only  nine. 
results have to be interpreted with some  caution. 
Thus  all  the 
A test of  Meiselman's  expectations theory about the  term structure 
of interest rates will  be  presented f.irst.  This  test shows  to what  extent 
innovations  in interest rates are  significantly correlated with  changes  in 
the  forward  rate.  The  innovation is defined  as  the  difference  between  the 
spot  rate  and  the  past  forward  rate.  This  d:lfference  is  the  forecasting 
error  made  by  using  the  forward  rate as  the  pred:lctor  of  the  future  spot 
rate.  The  test  suggests  to  what  extent  the  information  conta:lned  :ln  the 
current spot rate is incorporated  into the revision of the  forward  interest 
rates implicit in the  term structure. 
To  explain the tests made,  the following  symbols  are defined: 
R =  Actual  rate of :lnterest prevailing in the market,  annualized. 
An  interest rate of  10%  is expressed as  0.10 
r  =  Forward  rate of interest. 
The  subscript on the left refers to the month or week  in which the 
rate bec.omes  appl:lcable  (e.g.  t+n  stands  for  n  weeks  or months  from  week or 
month  t).  The  first  subscript  on  the  r:lght  refers  to  the  length  to 
maturity  of  the  deposit,  generally  expressed  in  months.  The  second 
subscript  on  the  r.tght,  refers  to  the  month  or  week  during  which  the 
expectation of the future interest rate is held  by  the market. 
Where: 
DEFINITIONS  RELEVANT  FOR  MEISELMAN'S  MODEL 
Pure  expectat.i.ons  theory: 
(1+Rn,t>n  =  (1+R1,t)(1+t+1r1,t>•••••(1+t+n-1r1,t> 
Hicksian  formulat.ton  of the forward  rate: 
( 1  +  Rn+ 1 , t)  n+ 1 
t+nr1,t = ----------
Rn,t  =  The  observed  rate at t.tme  t  with maturity n. -18-
THE  MEISELMAN  MODEL 
A.  THREE  MONTHS  FORECASTING  HORIZON 
( 1) 
where: 
forecasting error 
.f"  -'---~ 
=  F(tR3,t-tr3,t-3) 
( 1  +  %,t> 2 
t+3r3,t  =  - 1 
( 1  +  R3 It> 
( 1  +  R9,t-3>3 
t+3r3,t-3 =  - 1 
( 1  +  %,t-3>2 
( 1  +  %,t-3>2 
tr3,t-3  =  - 1 
( 1  +  R3,t-3) 
=  is  the  forward  interest rate on  a  3  month  deposit  expected at 
time  t  for  time  t+3 
t+3r3,t-3 = is the forward  interest rate on  a  3  months  deposit expected 
at time t-3  for  time  t+3.  Hence  the difference 
t+3r3,t-t+3r3,t-3 is the revision of the forward 
interest rate on  a  3  months  deposit which the market makes at 
tune  t  with respect to time t-3. 
tr3,t-3  =  is the  forward  interest rate on  a  3  months  deposit which 
the market  had  expected at time t-3  for  time t. 
Equation  (1)  states that at timet the market revises its opinion about the 
forward  rate on  a  3  months deposit relating to time  t+3  on the basis of the 
forcasting error it makes  at t.Une  t-3. -19-
B.  SIX  MONTHS  FORECASTING  HORIZON 
(2) 
(1+R9,t)3 
t+GrJ,t  - 3  =  - 1 
( 1+Rs,t>2 
(1+R12,t-J)4 
t+6r3,t-3  =  - 1 
( 1+R9,t-3)3 
where  tr3,t-3 and  tRJ,t are defined above. 
Table  4  contains  estimates  of  a  l:lnear  version  of  equations  ( 1) 
and  ( 2).  For  each  currency  th~  first  line  reports  the  estimates  of  a 
linear  version  of  equation  ( 1)  and  the  second  line  the  estimate  of  the 
l:lnear version of equation  (2). 
Before  interpret:lng  the  results  presented  :ln  Table  4  a  word  of 
caution :ls  in order.  From  the test presented one  can infer that the market 
revises  the  forward  rate on  the  basis  of  the  forecasting error only under 
certain restrictive assumptions.  If the risk  (liqu:ldity,  time)  pr~mium is 
zero  or  time  invariant  and  :lf  the  interest  rate  follows  a  univariate 
stationary  process  whose  innovations  are  orthogonal  to  the  history  of 
publicly  available  informat:lon,  then  the  optimal  forecasts  of  future 
interest  rates  w:lll  be  updated  exactly  as  Mei$elman's  model  predicts 
(Molino,  1986).  These  are  quite  restrictive  assumptions.  Another  reason 
for  interpreting the  results  of  Table  4  w:lth  caution  is that  the  interest 
rate  on  deposits  of  9  months  maturity  was  obtained  by  geometric 
interpretation. -20-
TABLE  4:  MEISELMAN'S  MODEL 
QUARTERLY  NON-OVERLAPPING  DATA  WITH  QUARTERLY  ERROR  ADJUSTMENT 
(Period:  January  1983  - September  1985) 
Revision of  Forward  Rate  =  a  +  b  •  Forecasting Error +  Epsilon 
EURO  - DOLLAR 
n  a  b  Ri:  o.w. 
3  0.003  1. 06  0.95  1.49 
(2.77)  (14.58) 
6  0.002  1.08  0.92  1.69 
(1.36)  (10.50) 
EURO.DEUTSCHE  MARK 
n  a  b  Ri:  o.w. 
3  0.003  1.13  o.88  2.38 
(2.56)  (8.00) 
6  0.002  1. 06  0.73  2.21 
(1.01)  (4.88) 
EURO  STERLING 
n  a  b  Ri:  o.w. 
3  -0.0009  o.8o  o.85  1.84 
(0.78)  (7.24) 
6  -0.0008  0.78  0.86  2.06 
(0.70)  (7.42) 
E  C  u 
n  a  b  Ri:  o.w. 
3  0.0004  0.44  0.36  1.90 
(0.21)  (2.23) 
6  -0.003  0.18  0.07  2.43 
(1.35)  (0.80) 
*  Numbers  in parentheses are t-statistics. -21-
For the Eurodollar and  the.Euromark the estimates of the parameter b 
fall  within  the  value  of  one  plus  or  minus  two  standard  deviations.  For 
these  two  Euro-currencies  the  estimates  of  b  for  the  6  months  forecasting 
horizon  are  not  significantly  below  the  estimate  of  b  for  the  3  months 
horizon.  For  both  horizons  these  markets  seem  to  make  strong  use  of  the 
informat.ton  contained  .tn  the  .tnterest  rate  innovation.  For  the 
Eurosterling  and  the  quoted  ECU  one  observes  that  the  est.tmates  of  h  are 
significantly  below  one  suggesting  a  less  than  complete  incorporat.i.on  of 
the new  information  into the  forecast of  the  future  interest rate.  For  the 
quoted  ECU  the estimates of b  are the  lowest. 
It has  already  been  mentioned  that  a  problem  of  Meiselman's  tests 
is  the  existence  of  a  risk  premium  which  changes  through  time.  There  is 
unfortunately  not  much  agreement  in  the  literature  on  how  to  measure  the 
liquidity premium.  Nevertheless  in Table  5  an  attempt was  made  to measure 
the  l~quidity premium  on  the  four  Euro-currencies  for  deposits  of  up  to  12 
months,  following  Santomero  (1975).11) 
The  liqu.i.dity  prem:la  are  qu.i.te  h:lgh  for  all  currenc.i.es  except  the 
Pound  Sterl:lng.  Accord.i.ng  to  the  calculat.i.ons  investors  seem  to require a 
premium of about  80  basis points on an annual basis to hold dollar deposits 
for  6  months  rather  than  for  three  months.  The  premium  amounts  to almost 
200  basis points for  12  months  dollar deposits.  For  the  DM  the  premium is 
about  50  basis  points  for  6  months  deposits  and  130  for  12  months 
deposits.  For the quoted  ECU  it is about  70  basis points  for  the  6  months 
maturity and  about  140  for  the  12  months maturity. 
(11)  The  pre~i.um is calculated as  follows: 
First one  computes  the asset return as: 
( 1+tRn,t>n 
An,t = ---------------------------
(1+t+1Rn-1,t+1>n-1 
- 1 
The  prem.i.um  is: 
Pn,t =  An,t  - tR1,t 
where  the  symbol  tRn,t  stands  for  the  market interest rate  on  an asset of 
maturity n  observed at time t. -22-
- Table 5  -
Liquidity  Premium 
month1y  datajaverages  for  period:octobcr  1982-august  1985 
(standard  deviation  in  brackets) 
========================================================================= 
PREMIUM  FOR  THREE  MONTH  HOLDING  PERIOD 
========================================================================= 
currency 
6  month 
Asset  mnturity 
9  months  12  mont.hs 
===:==~================================================================== 
usd  O.i7n  1 . 301  1. 94R 
(1.~19)  (~.5.'>3)  (3.1J5t") 
dm  0.526  0.878  l.:!CJS 
(o.s.:.:n  (1.175)  l 1 . ,;.:. (' ) 
stg  -0. 166  -o. 166  -0. 186 
(1.:!86)  (:!.:!15)  (3.107) 
ecu  0.717  1.009  1.422 
(0.688)  (1.065)  (1.3i7) 
ecu-;':  0.688  1. 057  1.502 
(0.676)  (1.068)  (1.487) 
========================================================================= 
=====--=================================================================== 
PRENIL'~1  FOR  SIX  ~10!'-:TH  HOLDING  PERIOD 
========================================================================= 
currency  As~et maturity 
12  month~ 
========================================================================~ 
usd  1. 123 
(1.981) 
dm  0.652 
(0.7:!5) 
stg  -0.064 
(1.146) 
ecu  0.840 
(0.497) 
ecu'l':  0.942 
(0.576) 
========================================================================= 
*  combin~d curocurrency  ecu  interest rate -23-
The  liquidity premia for holding a  deposit for  12  months  rather than 
6  have  the  same  ranking  by  currency  as  those  calculated  for  3  months 
holding periods12)  the highest premium being recorded  for the us  dollar and 
the  lowest  for  the  DM  and  the  pound.  The  variability  of  the  liquidity 
premia,  as  measured  by  their  standard  deviations,  was  also quite  high.13) 
It  is  worth  not.i.ng  that  for  the  ECU  it  is  amongst  the  lowest  of  all 
maturities and  for all holding periods. 
In  a  recent  article  Fama  (1984)  presents  a  generalization  of 
Meiselman'  s  model  which  allows  for  time  varying  risk  prem.i.a  and  wh.i.ch 
incorporates  Meiselman's  pure  expectations  theory  as  a  special  case.  Fama 
cons.i.ders  the  following  regressions  (where  the  error  terms  have  been 
omitted for simplicity): 
(3)  P3,t =  a1  +  b1(t+3r3,t  - tR3,t) 
(4)  t+3R3,t+3-tR3,t= a2+b2(t+3r3,t-tR3) 
He  calls  the  term  in  brackets  the  current  forward  spot 
differential.  This differential  .i.s  different from the  foreca.st.i.ng error of 
equations  ( 1)  and  ( 2).  Equat.i.ons  (3)  and  (4)  imply  that  changes  in  the 
current  forward  - spot  differential  influence  both  the  risk  premium  P3,  t 
and  the  future  change  in  the  spot  rate  t+3R3,t+3-tR3,t•  Evidence 
that  b1  is  reliably positive  means  that  the  current  forward  rate contains 
information about the premium.  Ev.i.dence  that b2  is rel.i.ably positive means 
that the current forward  rate has power as predictor of the spot rate to be 
observed  at  time  t+  3 •  Under  Meiselman  • s  pure  expectations  theory  the 
coefficient  b1  is  equal  to  zero  (there  is  no  premium  or  the  premium  is 
time  invariant)  and  the coefficient  b2  is equal  to  1.0.  In  this  case it 
follows  from  (4)  that: 
(5)  t+3R3,t+3  =  a2  +t+3r3,t+ Error  term 
which  says  that  the  forward  rate  is  an  unbiased  predictor  of  the  future 
spot rate, if in addition a2  is equal to zero. 
(12)  See the bottom half of Table s. 
(13)  They are reported between brackets in Table s. -24-
Table  6  contains  tests  of  equation  (4)  with  non-overlapping 
quarterly  data.  The  most  satisfactory  results  are  obtained  for  the 
Deutsche  Mark  and  the  ECU  for  which  the  estimate  of  the  coefficient  h2  is 
reliably  posit.tve  and  not  significantly  different  from  1.  For  both  of 
these  currencies  the  o.w.  statistics indicate  the  absence  of  s.i.gnif.tcant 
autocorrelation of the residuals and  the  R2  is sat.tsfactory. 14) 
~  test whether  the  forward  interest rate  .i.s  an  unbiased  pred.i.ctor 
of  the  future  spot  interest  rate,  the  following  regression  has  been 
est.tmated,  following Frenkel  (1976): 
(6)  tR3,t = a  +  b  tr3,t-3 + Error term 
where  the  current  3-month  rate  and  is  the 
three-month  forward  rate observed at time t-3. 
If the constant in this regression doesn't differ siqn.i.f.tcantly  from 
zero and  the coefficient on the forward  rate doesn't differ from unity,  the 
latter is an  unbiased predictor of the former. 
Table  7  contains  the  estimates  of  equation  (6)  for  the  four 
Euro-currencies,  performed  with  non  overlapping quarterly data.  While  all 
the regressions have  a  relatively weak  R2,  the o.w.  statistics indicate the 
absence  of  autocorrelation·  for  the  Eurosterling  and  the  ECU.  In  addition 
the  estimates  of  the  coefficient  b  for  these  two  ·currencies  are  not 
significantly different  from  1  and  the  estimates  of  the  coefficient  a  are 
not  signif:lcantly  different  from  zero.  For  the  private  ECU  and  for  the 
Euro-sterling  the  tests  presented  in  Table  7  seem  to  ind.tcate  that  the 
market is efficient. 
On  the  basis  of  the  tests  presented  in  Table  6  and  7  one  can  conclude 
that the  ECU  deposit market compares quite well with  the other Eurocurrency 
deposit  markets  cons.i.dered  here,  both  as  far  as  the  pred:lct:l  ve  power  of 
(14)  No  attempt  was  made  to  est.tmate  equation  (3)  because  of  the 
difficulties  in  extracting  reliable  time  series  of  the  r:t.sk  prem.tum  from 
the data. -25-
- TABLE  6:  Changes  in the spot rate on  the current forward  spot differential. 
Estimates of Equation  (4).  Quarterly non-overlapping data. 
(Period:  January  1983  - September  1985) 
a2  h2  R2 
EURO-DOLLAR  0.86  -1.89  0.21 
(1.11)  (1.54) 
EURO-DEUTSCHE  MARK  -0.58  1.18  0.31 
(2.27)  (2.01) 
EURO  STERLING  0.20  0.44  o.o3 
(0.56)  (0.56) 
ECU  -0.87  1.26  0.48 
(2.73)  (2.90) 
*  Numbers  in parenthesis are t-statistics 
TABLE  7:  Tests of market efficiency.  Quarterly non-overlapping data. 
(Period:  January  1983  - September  1985) 
a  b  R2 
EURQ-OOLLAR  5.21  0.43  0.19 
(1.65)  (1.43) 
EURQ-DEUTSCHE  MARK  4.21  0.23  0.11 
(3.13)  (1.04) 
EURO  STERLING  3.91  0.65  0.20 
(0.86)  (1.49) 
ECU  2.78  0.66  0.26 
(0.73)  (1.79) 
*  Numbers  in parenthesis are t-statistics 
o.w. 
2.10 
1.  74 
2.53 
2.22 
o.w. 
1.13 
1.23 
1.76 
2.25 -26-
I 
the  3-months  forward  rate  is  conc~rned  (Table  6)  and  as  far  as  the 
efficiency of  the market is concerned  (Table  7).  On  the other hand  the  ECU 
fares  badly as  far as  the pure  exp~ctations theory of the term structure of 
interest  rates  is  concerned  (Table  4).  This  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that 
expectations  of  realignments  and  of  changes  in  the  ECU  weights  have 
significantly  altered  the  term  structure  of  interest  rates  in  the  ECU 
deposit market.  For  the tests of  Table  4  interest rates  on  deposits  of  up 
to  12  months  maturity  were  used,  while  for  the  tests  of  Tables  6  and  1 
interest rates on deposits of only up to 6  months  maturity were  used. -27-
Appendix  1  - Methods to calculate the combined  ECU  interest rate 
The  theoretical ECU  interP.st rate can he calculated in four manners. 
The  first  two  methods  lead  under  certain  conditions  to  identical 
results7  the  same  holds for the other  two. 
The  difference  between  these  two  groups  of  computing  formulas  lies 
in  the  kind  of  exchange  rate  used  to  compute  the  weight  of  the  interest 
rate of each  component currency:  spot in the first two methods,  f~rward in 
the last two. 
METHOD  A. 
In  this  paper  the  following  formula  to  compute  the  theoretical  ECU 
interest rate has  been used: 
n 
combined  ECU  interest rate = ~  CUi  •  Ii 
L._.EXi 
i  =  1 
Where: 
n  = number of component currencies in the  ECU 
CUi  = units of currency  i  in the  ECU  basket def:lnition 
EX!  = spot exchange rate of  currency  i  against ECU  defined as a  number 
of units of currency  i  per ECU 
Ii  = currency  i  interest rate -28-
METHOD  B 
This  method  relies  on  the  interest  rates  of  member  currencies 
obtained  from  the  interest  rate  of  one  of  the  member  currencies  or  of  a 
third  currency  by  us.tng  the  assumpt.ton  of  interest  rate  arbitrage.  The 
spot exchange rate is used  to  compute  the  component  currency  weight  in the 
ECU,  as in Method  A. 
This method  can be viewed  as  the  same  as  the first one,  only if the 
interest parity  conditio~ holds perfectly. 
Theoretical  ECU  interest rate 
i  = 1 
Where 
I  =  interest rate on  base currency x. 
FP  =  forward.  premium  or  discount  for  component  currency  i 
against the base  currency x,  expressed  in annual  percentag~ 
terms. 
METHOD  C 
This  formula is a  variant of Method  A obtained  by replacing the spot 
exchange rate by the forward  exchange rate. 
n 
Theoretical  ECU  interest rate - ~  CUi  •  Ii  - L  FXi 
i  =  1 
Where: 
=  forward  exchange  rate  of  currency  i  against  the·  ECU 
defined as units of  component  currency  i  per ECU. -29-
METHOD  D 
This mathod,  callad commarcial  bank mathod,  uses  an outright forward 
exchanga rata against tha ECU. 
We  know  that  the  forward  exchange  rate  of  currency  i  against  the 
ECU,  under  covered interest rate parity is given by: 
[ 
( 1  +  Ii  )  1oo 
FXi  =  EX!  + EX!  •  -------.----- - 1 
(1  +  IECU  1oo 
The  theoretical  rate  is  computed  by  solving  the  above  equation  for 
ECU  interest rate  =  •  EXi 
- 1 J  .  100  tx·  .:t 
The  resulting  ECU  interest  rate  is  lower  than  the  rate  generated 
using spot exchange rates.  This is due to the fact that high interest rate 
currencies are at a  discount under  covered  interest parity and  consequently 
these  currencies  have  a  lower  percentage  weight  in  the  basket  than  when 
spot exchange rates are  applied  to the  fixad  currency units,  as  in Methods 
A and  B. -30-
Appendix  2:  Description· and  Sources of the data  used 
A.  EURORATES 
Thf!  Euro-markf!t  !ntf!rf!st  ratf!s  ( supplif!d  by  Chasf!  Econometrics 
Interactive  Data  Corporation)  are  weekly  averages  of  daily  market  closing 
rates  (Source:  Financial Times). 
The  data used are middle rates between bid and  ask quotat!ons. 
The  maturities are  1  month,  3  months,  6  months,  12  months. 
The  9-month  rate  has  been  obtained  by  calculating  the  geometric  mean 
between 6  and  12  month  rates. 
The  period  covered  is  from  the  40th  week  of  1982  until the  39th  week  of 
1985. 
The  data  are  available  for  the  following  Euro-currencies:  US  Dollar, 
Deutsche  Mark,  Dutch  Guilder,  Belgian  Franc,  Danish  Krona,  Franch  Franc, 
Italian Lira,  ECU. 
For  the  Irish  Punt  and  the  Greek  Drachma,  the  corresponding  domestic 
interest rates  have  been  used  to calculate  the  combined  Euro-currency  ECU 
interest rates. 
For the Irish Punt the  1,  3  and  6  months maturities are available. 
The  6  month  rate has been used  as  a  proxy for the  12  month  rate. 
For  the  Greek  Drachma,  only  the  interest rate at the  3-month maturity is 
available,  this has  been used as a  proxy for all the other maturities. -31-
B.  DOMESTIC  INTEREST  RATES 
The  domestic interest rates used are: 
For  the  Deutsche  Mark,  the  3  month  interbank bid  rate,  weekly  (Wednesday 
quotation) • 
For the Irish Punt,  the 3  month deposit middle rate,  weekly average. 
For  the  Pound  Sterling,  the  3  month  conmercial  paper  ask  rate,  weekly 
(Wednesday  quotation). 
For  the  Italian  Lira,  the  79-days  Treasury  Bill  middle  rate,  weekly 
(Wednesday quotation). 
For  the  French  Franc  the  3  months  interbank  paper  rate  was  used,  ask 
rate  (Wednesday  quotations) 
For the Dutch Guilder,  the  3  month  large bank deposit ~iddle rate,  weekly 
(Wednesday  quotation). 
For  the  Belgian  Franc,  the  120-days  Treasury  Bill  middle  rate,  weekly 
(Wednesday quotation). 
For the  Danish Krone,  the short-term bill rate, monthly. 
For  the  Greek  Drachma,  the  3  month  money  market  offered  rate  for 
convertible Drachma,  weekly average. 
The  Source  for  the  Drachma  is  The  Bank  of  Greece,  for  all  the  other 
currencies,  the source is Chase  Econometrics  Interactive Data corporation. 
C.  EXCHANGE  RATES 
The  exchange  rate  data  are  national  currencies  against  the  ECU.  They 
are  weekly  averages  of  middle  rates.  The  source  is  the  Financial  Times 
(data  collected  by  Chase  Econometrics),  except  for  the  Greek  Drachma 
exchange  rate  where  the  source  is  the  Commission  of  the  European 
Communities. -32-
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